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Comment

Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc.: The Intersection of Patent Law and
Antitrust Law in the Context of Patent Tying
Arrangements

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is increasingly common for businesses to sell products that are
protected by a patent. But what happens when the company markets
a bundle of products where some products are protected by patents, but
others are not? Under well-settled antitrust jurisprudence, such
marketing typically would raise antitrust concerns as a tying arrangement only where there are at least two separate products, the company
has market power over one of the products, and the company requires
that customers buy one or more additional products as part of a bundle.'
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,2 the United States
Supreme Court grappled with the issue of whether the existence of
patent protection over one product created market power in that product
market such that the presence of market power is presumed for patent

1.
2.

N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
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tying arrangements.3 Antitrust enforcement agencies, economists, and
academics have long concluded that the mere presence of a patent does
not automatically provide economic market power.4 However, a long
line of cases by the Supreme Court have suggested otherwise, creating
confusion among the lower courts facing this issue.
In Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court reversed the long-standing
per se presumption of illegality under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act5
for patent tying arrangements on the basis that the approach was flawed
from the beginning and required reversal.6 This presumption originated
over sixty years ago in InternationalSalt Co. v. United States, 7 which
incorporated the patent misuse doctrine into antitrust law. 8 However,
this presumption has faced increasing criticism over the last twenty
years due to congressional revisions to the patent misuse doctrine, which
have eroded the foundation for the presumption.9 The decision in
Illinois Tool Works brings the treatment of patent tying arrangements
into alignment with the law regarding tying arrangements in general,
which requires proof of market power in the tying product market prior
to finding that a tying arrangement violates antitrust law. 10 Therefore,
plaintiffs asserting patent tying claims must establish all of the

3. Id. at 1284.
4. Id. at 1293.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The current version of § 1 reads in full as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$ 100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id.
6. Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1290-91.
7. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
8. Id. at 395-96.
9. See Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). The specific language
of the provision states:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having... (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power
in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned.
Id. § 271(d).
10. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1977).
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elements of a tying violation under § 1, including defining a market to
evaluate the tying arrangement and showing that the defendant has
market power in that market."
This Comment explores the recent decision of Illinois Tool Works and
how that decision reversed the rule of per se illegality for patent tying
arrangements in antitrust law. Parts II and III outline the evolution of
the per se rule for patent tying arrangements and the problems
associated with the per se approach. Part IV examines the Illinois Tool
Works history and the facts that led to the Supreme Court's rejection of
the per se rule in favor of a rule of reason approach for patent tying
arrangements. Finally, Part V discusses the positive and negative
implications that may result from the adoption of the rule of reason
approach.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE PER SE RULE FOR PATENT TYING
ARRANGEMENTS

A.

The Ostensible Tension Between Antitrust and Patent Law

In 1789 the Constitution endowed Congress with the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 2 For almost one hundred years, no laws
conflicted with the granting of what can be characterized as limited
duration monopolies. In 1890, however, Congress passed the Sherman
Antitrust Act,' 8 which established American antitrust laws and created
the apparent inconsistency in Congress's treatment of "monopolies." In
1914 the tension became even clearer when Congress enacted § 3 of
chapter 323 of the Clayton Act.' 4 The Clayton Act makes it unlawful

11. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
14. Ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000)).
The current version of § 14 reads in full as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from,
or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
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"to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, ... whether
patented or unpatented" by placing a condition on the purchaser not to
use goods of a competitor where the condition may "substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." 5
The tension between the doctrines of patent and antitrust law appears
wholly irreconcilable at first glance. Patent law, after all, allows for
exclusion, while antitrust law is designed to require entry. However,
antitrust and patent law share complementary objectives such as
"promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare." 16 Antitrust
law incorporates these goals by ensuring that companies do not use
market power to exploit consumers, force competitors out of the market,
or prevent competitors from entering the market.17 Without antitrust
law, companies would be able to take advantage of market power in a
manner that is anticompetitive. Innovation and creativity suffer because
those with market power can prevent the entry of new players. Patent
law strives to achieve these common goals by granting creators of novel
products or works a limited monopoly to control the use of that work or
invention.' s Without patent protection, inventors struggle to obtain the
benefit of their inventions.
While some observers argue that the two disciplines work together to
accomplish consumer benefit, other critics contend that the approaches
are so diverse that the common goals do little to reconcile the approaches. In order to optimize productivity and promote creativity, a careful
balance must be struck between antitrust law and patent law. Antitrust
law cannot be construed so broadly that it strips away property rights
to the frustration of inventors, and patent law cannot be construed so
broadly that it allows patentees to stifle competition.
As antitrust law developed, it tended to surround patent law,
restricting patent rights in two ways. First, the Sherman Act barred
activities that placed an unreasonable restraint on trade or tended to
create monopolies, 9 which were actions specifically granted through

lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
16. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 1.0 (Apr. 6, 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
13,132, available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm
[hereinafter IP Guidelines].
17. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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patent laws.2 ° Second, antitrust law borrowed the concept of patent
misuse from patent law but significantly increased the consequences
associated with an act of patent misuse.21 Under patent law, a party
found guilty of patent misuse was prevented from enforcing the patent
until the misuse was corrected, whereas the same act subjected the
patentee to treble damages under antitrust law.2 2 Used either as a
claim or a defense, patent misuse is a vehicle by which a party may
assert a theory of competitive harm that is akin to an antitrust claim.
Establishing a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof that
a defendant entered into a contract that restrained trade or commerce
and that a plaintiff was damaged by the violation.2 3 Over time, two
distinct types of inquiry into the legality of agreements under § 1 have
evolved: rule of reason and per se illegality.24 The rule of reason is
essentially a balancing test between the procompetitive and the
anticompetitive effects of an agreement.25 If the procompetitive effects
are greater than or equal to the anticompetitive effects, then the practice
is lawful. If the procompetive effects are less than the anticompetitive
effects, then the practice is unlawful. The rule of reason approach
requires proof of four elements: (1) existence of a relevant market that
was affected by the restraint; (2) possession of market power by the
defendant within that market; (3) an anticompetitive effect in the
intrabrand or interbrand market; and (4) negative effects on competition
that are not outweighed by the positive effects on competition.26
The per se illegality concept bypasses the rule of reason balancing test
and outlaws certain agreements categorically, without consideration of
whether they are, in fact, anticompetitive or procompetitive.27 The per
se analysis presumes the existence of market power and does not look
into the reasonableness of the action. 2' The per se analysis is typically
used "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the
Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn
it." 29 Thus, a per se illegality approach lessens the burden for plaintiffs

20. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
21. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
22. Id.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
24. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1350,
1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003), afftd, 376 F.3d 1065 (l1th Cir. 2004).
25. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
26. Spanish Broad. Sys., 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
27. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
28. See id.

29. Id.
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to prove an antitrust violation and should only be used in cases where
the circumstances justify application of such a presumption.
B.

History of Patent 7ing

1. Patent Tying Arrangements as Patent Misuse. A tying
arrangement is a restraint on trade within the meaning of the Sherman
Act.30 Tying arrangements are agreements that require the purchase
of products (tied items) as a precondition to the purchase of other
products (tying items). 1 For example, a tying arrangement exists
when a consumer purchases a printer from a printer manufacturer and
is also required to purchase the ink from the printer manufacturer as a
condition of the printer purchase. The printer is the tying item and the
ink is the tied item. The printer manufacturer is trying to extend its
market power from the printer market into the ink market.
A tying arrangement is particularly likely to be given per se illegality
treatment in the courts, 2 but the United States Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission do not usually challenge tying
arrangements as anticompetitive unless: "(1) the seller has market power
in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market for the tied product, and (3) efficiency
justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive
effects."33 Tying arrangements that involve a patented item as the
tying product have historically been found to be per se illegal because
"[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is
patented."3'
This assumption arose from hostility to patent tying
arrangements, which were viewed as an attempt by patent owners to
extend their limited monopoly from the patented items into markets that
reach beyond the patent.35 As a result, patent tying arrangements
have been subjected to a per se rule of illegality that is inconsistent with
other areas of antitrust law.
A patent tying arrangement is simply a tying arrangement in which
the tying item is patented. The sale of a tying item (the patented
product) is conditioned upon the sale of a tied item (the unpatented
product), and the patent holder has sufficient economic power in the

30. See 10 PHLI E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINuPLEs AND THEIRAPPLICATION para. 1730, at 406-14 (1996).
31. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6.
32. See, e.g., id. at 9.
33. IP Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 5.3.

34. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
35. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
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tying item's market to force the sale of the tied item.86 In the printer
example, the arrangement would be a patent tying arrangement if the
printer was patented, but the ink was not. The printer manufacturer
would be using its printer market power to gain an advantage in the
unpatented ink market.
The concern over patent tying emerged because patentees were using
their exclusive rights in the patented market to create a restraint on
competition in the tied product market. This concern, that the patentee
should not be able to extend its limited monopoly to other markets, is
commonly referred to as patent misuse.37 The patent misuse doctrine
arose before there was any significant body of federal antitrust law and
has been described as an equitable concept designed to prevent use of
patents in a way that violates public policy.18 Patent misuse, in the
tying context, is an equitable defense for an infringing user against a
patent holder who inappropriately uses his legally granted patent rights
to gain control over the market for nonpatented goods.39
2. Early Decisions Precipitated the Need for the Patent Misuse
Doctrine. The patent misuse doctrine was created in response to a
line of cases that had expanded patent owner rights in the context of
contributory infringement, such as Heaton-PeninsularButton-Fastener
Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.' and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.4 Contributory infringement enables a patent owner to enforce his patent against a
party that intentionally contributed to infringement by selling a
necessary, but unpatented, element of the patented invention to the
infringer.4 2 In these infringement cases, patentees were given broad
rights, not just over their patented products, but over products used in
conjunction with the patents.
In Heaton-Peninsularthe tying item was a patented machine that
attached buttons to shoes using unpatented fasteners, the tied items. A
label attached to the patented machines conditioned the sale of the
machine on the buyer's promise to purchase the unpatented fasteners
from the patentee. The patentee sued a competing fastener manufacturer who sold fasteners to owners of the patented machines.
The
defendant claimed that the tying arrangement was void because of

36. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6.
37. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1942).
38. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827,836 (1950).
39. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703-04 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
40. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
41. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
42. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17, 100).
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public policy that forbids extending the patent "monopoly" into the
unpatented market.48 The Sixth Circuit upheld the tying provision on
the basis that the quantity of fasteners sold by the patentee depended
on the sale of the patented machine. 4 Specifically, the court stated
that the control the patentee held over the fastener market was "an
incident from," and a "legitimate result of the patentee's control" over,
the patented machine.45
The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Henry, where a patented mimeograph machine was licensed with the
restriction that it was to be used only in conjunction with the patentee
company's "stencil paper, ink and other supplies."'
The defendant
substituted another ink for the patentee's ink in the mimeograph
machine, and the patentee sued for infringement.4" The Court held
that the arrangement did not violate antitrust laws or public policy
because the buyer did not suffer any harm from the arrangement,48
which required the buyer to purchase paper and ink from the patentee
as a condition of the sale of the patented machine. 49
3. Section 3 of the Clayton Act was Adopted to Limit These
Decisions and the Power of Patentees. The broad judicial
protection offered to patentees did not enjoy an extended life. In 1914
Congress passed § 3 of the Clayton Act,5" which was intended to
invalidate the sale of patented items that included a condition requiring
buyers to purchase all unpatented accessories from the patentee. 5 One
of Congress's main objectives in adopting § 3 was to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Henry.5 2 Congress overturned this decision
out of its concern that similarly-situated sellers would gain a competitive
advantage in the tying product market without achieving a competitive
efficiency in that market, as required by antitrust law policy.53 In

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Heaton-Peninsular,77 F. at 289-90.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Henry, 224 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 12.
§ 3, 38 Stat. at 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14).
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 (1984).
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 137 (1936).
Id.
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several subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
Clayton Act effectively superseded its decision in Henry.54
4. Patent Misuse Decisions Following the Adoption of Section
3 of the Clayton Act. In light of the passage of § 3, which was
intended to reach patent tying arrangements, the United States
Supreme Court decided Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co." This case marked the beginning of the patent
misuse doctrine, although the doctrine would not be referred to by that
name for another twenty-five years. Following the policy underlying § 3,
the Court reversed Henry56 and signaled a complete retreat from earlier
decisions giving broad rights to patent holders.57
In Motion PicturePatents, the patentee licensed the use of a motion
picture projection film feeder on the condition that the licensee would
only show films leased from persons authorized by the patent owner.58
Although the Second Circuit held that the conduct violated § 3, the
Supreme Court did not reach that issue. 9 Instead, the Court affirmed
the Second Circuit's decision on the basis that the arrangement violated
public policy.60 The Court reasoned that imposing a condition on the
licensee to show only films authorized by the patentee allowed the
patentee to derive monopoly profits from a market that extended beyond
the scope of the patent.6 ' The Court viewed such an arrangement as
creating a monopoly in the unpatented motion picture film industry.62
While the Court determined that it was unnecessary to apply § 3 to
resolve the issue, the Court recognized that § 3 was a persuasive source
of public policy that influenced the Court's decision.63
The Court's determination to decide the matter through public policy
clearly ignored the language of the statute, which condemns patent tying
arrangements only when the "effect of such... sale.. . may be to
substantiallylessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line

54. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2006); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1917) (explaining that in
light of § 3 of the Clayton Act, Henry "must be regarded as overruled").
55. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
56. Id. at 518.
57. See, e.g., Heaton-Peninsular,77 F. at 296; Henry, 224 U.S. at 32.
58. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 506.
59. Id. at 517-18.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 513.
62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 517-18.
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of commerce."' The language of the statute suggests that the courts
must conduct an economic analysis to determine whether the arrangement substantially lessens competition. 65 However, the Court did not
perform such an analysis.66 Rather, the Court sidestepped § 3 by
6 7
creating a judicial policy to reach the patent tying arrangement.
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court coined the term "patent
misuse" for inappropriate patent tying arrangements." In Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,69 the Court affirmed the judicial rule created
in Motion Picture Patents.70 Again, the Court bypassed the issue of
whether § 3 applied. 71 Rather, the Court used judicial equitable power
to invalidate a patent tying arrangement where the patentee used the
arrangement to restrain competition in the unpatented market.7 2
In that case, the patentee was a canning company that operated a
wholly-owned subsidiary devoted to making and leasing patented tablet
depositing machines and to making and selling salt tablets. The
patentee's profits were primarily derived from the sale of the salt tablets,
and the lease of the machines was a means to obtain salt tablet sales.
The lease agreements with commercial canners of vegetables required
the canners to purchase salt tablets exclusively from the patentee. The
defendant, a commercial canner, was also in the business of mining,
processing, and selling salt. In addition to selling competing salt tablets,
the defendant also made and leased its own unpatented salt tablet
dispensing machines to canners.
The patentee alleged that the
defendant's machines infringed its patent.73
The Supreme Court created a per se application of the misuse
doctrine, which meant that parties alleging patent misuse were not
required to prove the existence of actual market power. 74 Rather,
market power was presumed from the presence of the patent on the
tying item. The Court held that because the patentee conditioned the
lease of patented machines on the sale of unpatented accessories, the
patentee could not restrain the defendant from selling like materials as

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

15 U.S.C. § 14 (emphasis added).
See id.
Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 518.
Id.
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
G. S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 969 (7th Cir. 1941).
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
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a contributory infringer.7' The Court stated that this rule applied
"regardless, of whether the particular
defendant... suffered
from ... misuse of the patent."7M The per se rule was designed to
discourage patentees from making use of a patent monopoly to restrain
competition in the marketing of unpatented articles.77 In light of the
difficulty in proving the necessary anticompetitive effect required under
§ 3, the Court again chose to follow the judicially-created rule in Motion
Picture Patents to reject the Seventh Circuit's analysis of § 3. 7' The
Court ignored the antitrust question and decided the case on public
policy grounds.79
Although most courts treated patent tying arrangements as examples
of patent misuse, the Seventh Circuit in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies,
Inc."° noted in dicta that Heaton-Peninsular and Henry are better
reasoned than Motion Picture Patents and its progeny because of the
competitive effects of patent tying arrangements.8 ' The court stated
that the tying arrangement was, in effect, a form of price discrimination. 2 Because there is no principle that forbids price discrimination
for patent owners, the court stated that "it is unclear why one form of
discrimination, the tie-in, alone is forbidden."'
Despite congressional intent to invalidate patent tying arrangements
under § 3 only when there is evidence of substantial lessening of
competition, Motion Picture Patents created a judicial rule that has
effectively precluded application of § 3 to all patent tying arrangements.
The preclusion is the result of a consistent approach that presumes
patent misuse occurs even when the restraint on competition in the tied
market is not severe enough to trigger application of the Clayton or
Sherman Acts.
5. Migration of Patent Misuse Presumption into Antitrust
Law-Creation of the Per Se Rule. In 1947 the judially-created rule
of per se illegality began its transformation from patent law into
antitrust law via International Salt Co. v. United States84 and its
progeny. In InternationalSalt, the patentee held patents on two salting

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

493-94.
494.
492.
494.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir, 1982).
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
Id.

84.

332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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machines, which it leased to canning processes on the condition that the
lessees purchase salt for the machines exclusively from the patentee. 5
The Supreme Court held that the patent tying arrangement was an
illegal restraint on trade, which violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.86
The Court did not explain why patent tying arrangements were illegal.
However, the Court did cite to recently decided patent misuse decisions
as apparent justification for the new rule in antitrust cases.87 While
the patent misuse cases had created a per se application of the misuse
doctrine when a patent tying arrangement was present, none had gone
so far as to pronounce the arrangements per se invalid. Although the
Court gave no explicit basis for holding that patent tying arrangements
were illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court has consistently
cited InternationalSalt as justification for the per se rule throughout the
doctrine's history. 9 After stating that the arrangement was illegal, the
Court in International Salt went on to analyze the patentee's market
power as an attempt to bolster its holding in light of its weak legal
foundation.90 However, this analysis established a precedent whereby
courts would deem tying arrangements per se illegal only after
performing a similar market analysis.91
Further transformation of patent misuse into antitrust law occurred
92
in United States v. ParamountPictures,
in which the Court extended
the doctrine and applied the per se rule to tying arrangements when the
tying product is copyrighted.93 In ParamountPictures,film distributors
were block-booking copyrighted films when licensing them to exhibitors.94 As in InternationalSalt, the Court cited to patent misuse cases
for the proposition that copyright tying arrangements are per se illegal
by virtue of the copyright. 95

85. Id. at 394.
86. Id. at 395-96.
87. Id. at 396 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt, 314

U.S. 488).
88. See William Montgomery, The Presumptionof Economic Power for Patented and
Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1142 n.12 (1985).
89. Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1289.
90. See Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. at 394-96.
91. Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

93. Id. at 157.
94. Id. at 140-41. Block-booking is defined as licensing, or offering to license, one film

or a group of films on condition that the licensee also license another film or group of films
from the same distributor. Id. at 156.
95. Id. at 157.
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Eventually, the Supreme Court invoked the patent misuse rationale
in antitrust law to invalidate tying arrangements in which no intellectual property rights were present in any form. In Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States,96 the Supreme Court established that
tying arrangements are per se illegal when the seller holds a "monopolistic position" in the tying product market and is involved in "a substantial volume of commerce" in the tied product market.9 7 The Court
relied on an analogy between a patent and a general product monopoly
to justify the extension of the rule of per se illegality.9' However, the
Court did not presume the presence of market power in the tying
product market and conducted an actual inquiry into whether the tying
arrangement created an unreasonable restraint on competition in the
tied product market.99 Therefore, the Court applied a rule of reason
approach to analyze the legality of nonpatent tying arrangements
because there was -no basis upon which to presume the presence of
market power.
Following Times-Picayune, the Court further relaxed the standard
required to invalidate nonpatent tying arrangements. In Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States,"° the Supreme Court held that tying
arrangements were per se illegal when the seller holds sufficient power
in the tying product market to "appreciably restrain free competition in
the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce is affected."1 ' In Northern Pacific, the railroad
sold and leased land under agreements that required the lessee to use
the railroad's lines to ship all commodities produced or manufactured on
the land, so long as its rates were equal to competing carriers' rates."°2
Under Northern Pacific, a tying arrangement violated antitrust laws
when the seller merely possessed an amount of power that acted as a not
insubstantial restraint on trade.'0 3 The Court justified application of
the per se standard on the basis that "'tying agreements serve hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.'""'
To reach this outcome, the Court appears to have misconstrued the
rationale behind the InternationalSalt decision. Specifically, the Court
stated that its decision in InternationalSalt "placed no reliance on the

96. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
97. Id. at 608-09.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 611-27.
100. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 6 (quoting Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 305-06).
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fact that a patent was involved .... If anything, the Court held the
challenged tying arrangements unlawful despite the fact that the tying
item was patented, not because of it." 105 While market power can be
shown in ways other than a patent grant, the Court in InternationalSalt
did, in fact, rely predominantly on the patent misuse doctrine and
conducted a weak form of market power analysis as an afterthought.0 6
Therefore, the statement that the Court in InternationalSalt placed no
reliance on the presence of a patent is inconsistent with the per se
analysis conducted by the Court to reach its conclusion. As a result,
InternationalSalt does not provide support for the decision reached in
Northern Pacific that a tying arrangement is per se illegal based on an
analysis of the extent of the restraint on competition in the tying and
tied product markets.
6. Creation of the Presumption of Market Power in Patent
Tying Arrangements. Once again, the Supreme Court broadened the
application of the per se illegality rule in United States v. Loew's,
Inc.0 7 Similar to the facts in Paramount Pictures, the United States
brought antitrust actions against distributors of copyrighted motion
picture feature films for their engagement in block-booking. Specifically,
the defendants were attempting to condition the license or sale of one or
more feature films upon the acceptance by a television station of a block,
which contained one or more unwanted or inferior films.' 8 The Court
held that the arrangement was illegal because the difference in product
prices for the entire package was not based on cost. 0 9 As a result, the
defendant was able to acquire a noncost-driven premium on a coerced
license of the film block."0 The Court further reduced the market
power requirement by stating that the seller must demonstrate market
power in the tying product market through a showing of(1) "some power
to control price and to exclude competition," (2) the "product's desirability to consumers," or (3) "uniqueness in its attributes." 1 '
Loew's represents the first case in which the Supreme Court refers to
a presumption of market power in a patent tying arrangement as the
basis for holding that the arrangement is per se illegal. While the Court
cited International Salt as the source of this rule, 2 InternationalSalt

105. Id. at 9.
106. Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. at 394-96.
107. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id. at 49, 54.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 45.
112. See id. at 45-46.
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did not actually mention any form of presumptions at all. Rather,
Loew's was the first decision to ever refer to applying a presumption to
a tying product subject to patent rights.
Loew's represents the high water mark of the Court's unfavorable
treatment of patent tying arrangements. While Loew's remained good
law until Illinois Tool Works, lower courts were split on whether to apply
a presumption of market power to patent tying arrangements. Some
courts followed Loew's and held that market power is presumed in
patent tying arrangements." 3 Other courts treated the presumption
as rebuttable and allowed the patentee to demonstrate that market
power did not exist in the patented market." 4 Still, other jurisdictions
chose to apply a rule of reason approach to patent tying arrangements,
which established an approach that preceded the Illinois Tool Works
decision." 5 Those courts applied a rule of reason approach to both
patent and nonpatent tying arrangements because the assumption that
a patent automatically confers market power on the patentee lacked
factual support.
7. Incorporation of Market Power Analysis Within the Per Se
Rule. Following the decision in Loew's, the Supreme Court reversed
course in United States Steel Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises,Inc. ("Fortner
I/),"' a follow-up decision to FortnerEnterprises,Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp. ("FortnerP')." 7 FortnerIf represents the Court's first true
application of a market power analysis to a tying arrangement, as
opposed to the trend of applying presumptions of market power and
illegality to such arrangements."' The Fortner cases involved a tying
arrangement in which the defendant offered to provide financing for a
development in return for the exclusive right to provide the manufactured homes for the development." 9 In Fortner I, the Court concluded
that the question of whether the defendant had sufficient market power
in the tying market to render the tying arrangement illegal was a triable
issue of fact. 2 ° In Fortner1I, the Court resolved the issue of whether

113. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977);
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F; Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
114. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. See, e.g., USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 511.
116. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
117. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
118. Ill.
Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1287.
119. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 497-98.
120. Id. at 509-10.
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the defendant's market121power was sufficient to cause the agreement to
violate antitrust laws.
In Fortner I, the Court followed the precedent of earlier Supreme
Court decisions, which applied a presumption of market power when the
product is "unique. " 122 However, unlike the Loew's approach, which
focused on the uniqueness of the product, the Court in Fortner 2I3
analyzed the "unique advantages" that the seller had in the market.
As a result, a seller who retains significant market power in the tying
product market may create an illegal tying arrangement, even when the
product itself is not unique."
In contrast, the Supreme Court in FortnerII held that the defendant's
market power must be proven through a rule of reason analysis because
there was no evidence that the defendant had unique advantages in the
market to justify a presumption of market power.' 21 In analyzing the
actual market conditions of the financing arrangement, the Court stated
that the financing arrangement appeared to be unique only because the
defendant was willing to accept a lesser profit and incur greater risks
than other financiers. 26 The Court held that those characteristics
were insufficient to justify equating the financing arrangement to a
"unique" product. 27 Without other proof of market power in the tying
product12 market, there was no basis for declaring the tying arrangement
illegal.
8. Laying the Groundwork for the Rejection of the Per Se
Rule. Following the decision in FortnerII, the Supreme Court affirmed
that market power must be proven as an element of an illegal tying
arrangement in Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde. 129 In
that case, the hospital entered into a contract that provided that all
anesthesiology services would be performed exclusively by members of
an outside anesthesiology group. An independent anesthesiologist who
was denied a staff position with the hospital claimed that the agreement
was an illegal tying arrangement because every surgery patient at the
hospital was forced to use the services of the outside anesthesiology

121.

Fortner11, 429 U.S. at 612-13.

122. Fortner1, 394 U.S. at 503.
123.
124.

Montgomery, supra note 88, at 1147.
See Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 509.

125. Fortner11, 429 U.S. at 622.
126.

Id. at 621-22.

127. Id. at 622.
128. Id.
129. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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group. 3 0 The Court reasoned that tying arrangements that do not
force buyers to purchase unwanted items along with the desired items
should not be condemned based on the presence of the tying arrangement alone.13 1 The concern is whether the two product markets are
being affected by the arrangement.3 2 In the case of surgery patients,
the Court held that it would be safe to assume that surgery patients are
not being forced to take an unwanted product (anesthesiology services)
in order to obtain the desired product (surgery)."
Also, there was no
evidence that either the hospital market or the anesthesiologist market
had been adversely affected by the arrangement."l ' Based on these
facts, the Court held that the agreement did not violate antitrust
35
laws.1
Although the Court refused to apply the per se rule against tying
arrangements in the nonpatent tying context, the majority suggested
3 6
that the per se rule should still apply to patent tying arrangements.
The Court utilized a two-tier approach to analyze the legitimacy of the
3 7
tying arrangement in Jefferson Parrish.
Initially, the Court concluded that the per se rule should not be applied because there was no
evidence that the buyers were forced to purchase the tied service.'
Next, the Court inquired into the actual effect of the tying arrangement
on competition in the market for the tied service." 9 It is this second
level of analysis, the inquiry into the actual effects on competition, that
the Court
suggested would not be necessary in patent tying arrange0
ments. 14
One significant aspect of Jefferson Parishinvolves Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion. While the majority continued to endorse a per se
approach for patent tying arrangements, Justice O'Connor provided the
foundation that led to the Court's recent decision in Illinois Tool Works
to abandon the per se approach for patent tying arrangements.' 4 '
Justice O'Connor sharply questioned the legitimacy of the presumption

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 17.
See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1288.
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Most notably,
of market power in the case of patented products.'
Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court's strict per se approach
always included some form of market power analysis, which resulted in
invalidating patent tying arrangements only when the seller had
substantial market power to the point of market control.'"
In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the proper inquiry for all tying
arrangements should be an economic analysis of the market situation
involved in the arrangement, including consideration of both the positive
and negative competitive effects of the tie-in.'" Under the market
analysis approach, the tying arrangement doctrine would be more
consistent with the antitrust goal of encouraging competition. 4 5
Further, Justice O'Connor argued that the presumption of illegality for
patent tying arrangements should be rebuttable.'" The mere presence
of a patent does not automatically guarantee that the patent holder has
market power."' 7
Rather, Justice O'connor asserted that such rare extensions of market
power are unlikely or pose no threat of economic harm, except when the
two markets involved and the nature of the two products tied satisfy
three threshold criteria: (1) the seller has power in the tying product
market; (2) there is a substantial threat that the seller will acquire
market power in the tied-product market; and (3) there is a coherent
economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as distinct.1"
As to the first criteria, Justice O'Connor argued that it is a misconception that the grant of a patent bestows market power on the patent
holder.'49 It is possible that the patent owner will have no market
power when close substitutes exist for the patented item. 5 ° In the
absence of such power, a tying arrangement will not have any adverse
impact in the tied-product market and can encourage competition in the
Regarding the second criteria, Justice
tying-product market.' 5 '
O'Connor asserted that no such threat exists if either the tied-product
market is occupied by many stable sellers or if entry barriers in the tiedproduct market are low.'5 2

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 37 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 37-39.
Id. at 37 n.7.

150. Id.
151.
152.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE PER SE RULE FOR PATENT TYING
ARRANGEMENTS

The treatment of tying arrangements has undergone an evolution
under antitrust law. The courts' treatment has canvassed a range of
views, including an explicit rule of reason approach, strict per se
illegality, and a truncated per se approach that is still referred to as per
The purpose of per se illegality is to incorporate
se illegality."
conduct that lacks competitive justification. This per se presumption
should not apply to tying arrangements, which carry the potential to
produce efficiencies for both the selling firm and the end users, thereby
outweighing alleged anticompetitive effects.
A. Per Se Approach Fails to Consider the Benefits of Tying
Arrangements
Patent tying arrangements have traditionally been viewed as
providing no economic benefit to anyone except the patent holder." 4
However, buyers of tied products may receive the benefits of these
arrangements where the seller passes on the cost savings obtained from
the arrangement.' 5 5 Such cost savings may result from a reduction in
marketing costs for the tied product, the savings obtained by bundling
into one sale, and the ability to streamline their operathe products
156
tion.

While concern over tying arrangements that prohibit competition in
the tied product market remains valid, the potential benefits consumers
may receive should also be given consideration before the arrangement
is considered illegal.'57 A per se approach does not allow such beneficial consideration, while a rule of reason approach does permit the court
to take these aspects into consideration. Notably, tying arrangements
have the effect of motivating competitors to lower prices of close
substitutes and to develop alternative inventions, which promotes the

153. Compare IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (applying a rule of
reason approach to invalidate a tying clause that required purchasers to use IBM's
perforated cards when similar cards were available from other manufacturers), with
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (holding that tying
arrangments involving loans and pre-fabricated home purchases were per se illegal).
154. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
155. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 55 (D.D.C. 1999).
156. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40-41 (1984).
157.

AREEDA, supra note 30, at para. 1703g.
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progress of science and provides additional substitutes in those markets."
Per Se Approach Driven by Fearof Monopolies
One of the major forces behind the adoption of a per se approach to
patent tying arrangements was fear of monopoly extension into a second,
'
This
unpatented market, also known as the "leverage theory." 59
theory was the basis for the Court's holding in InternationalSalt Co. v.
United States'6° and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States,6 1 that patent tying arrangements were per se illegal. In effect,
the Court merged the monopolization claim, which would have been
subject to a rule of reason analysis, into the tying claim, which was
decided under the per se doctrine. However, rather than incorporating
the monopoly concerns into a patent tying claim, the Court should have
required the plaintiffs to bring a separate monopolization claim. As a
result, the Court eased the plaintiff's burden to show monopolization in
the case of patent tying arrangements, which was consistent with the
Court's approach to reign in the power of patent holders.

B.

C. Per Se Approach is Inconsistent with Other Areas of Antitrust
Law
A presumption of true market power in patent tying cases is wholly
inconsistent with other aspects of antitrust law. Other areas of antitrust
law require proof of market power in some form, including monopolization claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 and non-tying claims
under § 1,163 which are evaluated under the rule of reason approach.
This inconsistency is highlighted when one considers whether the
presumption in patent tying arrangements should be rebuttable. If the
presumption is considered rebuttable, as the Federal Circuit stated in
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., then questions are
raised as to why the presumption was not rebuttable in United States v.
Loew's, Inc.1 5 and why the defendant has the burden in this particular
instance.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Pugh v. Mobil Oil Corp., 533 F. Supp. 169, 174-75 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. LV 2004).
396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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D. Per Se Approach Improperly Assumes that Patents Convey Market
Power
In Loew's the Court stated that "[tihe requisite economic power is
presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted." 6
However, patents rarely confer significant market power. Most often, a
patent is granted on narrow improvements to existing inventions. A
single patented product "may embody hundreds or conceivably thousands
of patented inventions."16 7
Furthermore, many competitors hold
patents in areas of heavily developed technology, which represent minor
improvements on similar products."6 To avoid infringement claims,
the competitors are forced to cross-license their patents. 1 69 As a result,
the assumption that a patent automatically conveys market power to the
patent holder does not reflect reality.
Further evidence that this presumption lacks support is found in the
fact that there has not been "any significant authority on antitrust or
intellectual property law who has defended the presumption in the
patent and copyright tying cases in the last twenty years."'70 Scholars
have long noted that the presumption is inherently flawed because it
originated without any requirement of a true market power analysis.' 7 '
In essence, legal precedent was the only basis for the per se presumption
since its creation. '
Another factor that cuts against the presumption is the length of a
patent grant, which extends twenty years from the date of the patent
application.' 7 2 The possibility that the item will retain the same level
of power in the market for the duration of its patent is unlikely.'73 An
actual survey of the technology in the marketplace must be coupled with
the existence of a patent to determine the retained viability of the
patented item.'74 Without considering the actual market conditions
associated with a patented item, the mere presence of a patent is not a
good predictor of market power.

166. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
167. Brief for the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 9, Il. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006)
(No. 04-1329) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae].
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Brief for the Petitioners at 39, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
171. AREEDA, supra note 30, at para. 1737b.
172. 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(2) (2000).
173. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 167, at 10.
174. See id.
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E. Per Se Approach No Longer Has Support From the Patent Misuse
Doctrine
Although Congress has remained silent on the standard for determining market power in antitrust violations, Congress did eliminate the
presumption of market power for patent tying arrangements in the
patent misuse context through the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988
("Act"). 17 The Act requires proof of actual market power to establish
a patent misuse defense based on patent tying.17 The Act was passed
four years after the Supreme Court affirmed the per se illegality
approach for patent tying arrangements in the antitrust context in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.177 While the Act is
limited to patent law, the language indicates that Congress did not
intend for a patent tying arrangement to be automatically condemned
without the presence of market power. 7 '
The analysis of tying arrangements in the context of patent misuse is
closely related to the analysis of tying arrangements in the context of
antitrust law because of the weight of anticompetitive effects in shaping
the defense of patent misuse. 1 79 Because of the similarities between
a § 1 antitrust violation and actions considered to be patent misuse,
market power should be proven in the same way for each type of
violation.'
In particular, conduct that may be considered a § 1
violation very often is considered patent misuse.'
Consequently, the
analysis of market power for both antitrust violations and patent misuse
claims should be consistent.
F Per Se Approach No Longer Has Support from FederalEnforcement Agencies
Following decades of hostility toward patent tying arrangements and
adherence to the per se rule by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), these agencies moved away from
the per se rule in 1995 with the passage of the Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property. 82 In these guidelines, the DOJ
and the FTC began to require a showing of market power in the tying

175. 35 U.S.C. § 271'(2000).
176. Id. § 271(d).
177. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
178. AREEDA, supra note 30, at para. 1737c.
179. See lii. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1290-91.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. IP Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.2.
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product market in order for a plaintiff to prove a violation of antitrust
laws. 8 ' These guidelines have remained the policy of these agencies
for over ten years.'
By enacting these rules, the DOJ and the FTC
have embraced a true rule of reason analysis "in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion."'85 To find a violation of antitrust law, the
agencies, through these guidelines, consider both the presence of market
power and the competitive
effects on the market where the patent holder
18 6
has the power.
The DOJ and the FTC conclude that patents do not create economic
monopolies, even though the granting of a patent creates a legal
monopoly. 8 ' . Under the guidelines, a patent tying arrangement is
analyzed as if the patent were any other form of property, which is in
line with other forms of antitrust doctrine. 8 One important consideration for the DOJ and FTC is the presence of substitutions in the
patented product market. 8 9
When substitutions are present, the
patent holder probably does not have the power to raise prices in the
market because the substitutions provide alternative choices to
consumers."9 Only in rare circumstances will a patented product be
so novel and innovative that no substitutes exist within the market.'9 '
IV.

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC. V. INDEPENDENTINK, INC.:
INTRODUCTION OF THE RULE OF REASON FOR PATENT TYING
ARRANGEMENTS

A.

Lower Courts' Decisions

Several lower courts rejected the per se illegality presumption for
patent tying arrangements, but this approach had not been affirmed by
the Supreme Court until Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc.'92 In that case, Illinois Tool Works's wholly-owned subsidiary,
Trident, Inc., 93 manufactured patented ink jet printheads and patented ink containers for use in the printheads and nonpatented inks which

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1292.
186. IP Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 5.3.
187. Id. at § 2.2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
193. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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were specially formulated for use in the printheads.'
Illinois Tool
Works licensed the equipment as a package to manufacturers to be
installed as components in printer equipment used to print bar codes on
corrugated materials and kraft paper. As part of the licensing agreement, the printer manufacturers and the end users were required to
purchase all of the ink from Trident.'95 Independent Ink developed an
identical ink to compete with the ink produced by Illinois Tool Works for
use in the patented printheads. Independent Ink then sued Illinois Tool
Works on the basis that the licensing agreement constituted an illegal
patent tying arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act."9
The district court followed the path taken by other lower courts of
rejecting the per se illegality presumption for patent tying arrangements.1 97 Specifically, the district court held that a plaintiff must
prove that a patentee has market power and has used the arrangement
as an anticompetitive restraint on trade as a prerequisite to finding that
a patent tying arrangement violates antitrust law. 98 Because there
was no proof of Illinois Tool Works's market power, the district court
held that the arrangement could not be per se illegal even though the
tying product was patented.'
The district court based its decision on
the dissent in Data General Corp. v.Digidyne Corp.,2° which followed
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson ParishHospitalDistrictNo.
2 v. Hyde.2 1 ' The dissent in Data General argued that the per se
presumption of illegality needed to be reexamined.0 ° In addition, the
district court relied on numerous lower court opinions which had refused
to treat patent tying arrangements as automatically creating an
irrebuttable presumption of market power.2 3
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held that patent
tying arrangements were subject to a per se presumption of illegali20 5
ty."° The court based its decision on United States v. Loew's, Inc.
and United States Steel Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises, Inc. 2 ' However,

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 1158.
Id.
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1285.
Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1167.
473 U.S. 908, 908-09 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
466 U.S. 2, 32-47 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 n.9.
Id. at 1163-64.
Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
371 U.S. 38 (1962).
429 U.S. 610 (1977).

2007]

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS

1059

the Federal Circuit did not follow those cases, instead holding that the
presumption is rebuttable and shifts the burden to the patentee to show
lack of market power.2 °7 In light of this holding, the case was remanded to the district court to allow Illinois Tool Works to present evidence
to rebut the presumption of market power.2"'
B.

The Supreme Court Decision in Illinois Tool Works
By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to consider

overturning the forty-three year old precedent from Loew's 20 9 that

tended to ease the burden for competitors to sue patent holders for
antitrust violations.2 10 In March 2006 the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the district court's approach and held that the presence of a
patent on the tying product does not create a presumption of market
power in the hands of the patent owner.2 ' Rather, the Court held
that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the patentee has such
market power in the tying product market.2 12
The Court reasoned that the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988213
had "substantially undermined" the dictum statement in Jefferson
Parishthat patents and similar monopolies create presumptive market
power.214 The Supreme Court viewed Congress's amendment to patent
2 15
law as an invitation to incorporate those changes to antitrust law.

Specifically, the Court held a patent tying arrangement does not violate
antitrust laws unless the patentee has market power in the patented
product market. 21 To justify incorporating the change in presumption
for patent tying arrangements into antitrust law, the Court emphasized
that the patent misuse doctrine was the very foundation for the per se
presumption in antitrust law.2

17

Because the presumption of market

power had been statutorily changed, the Court reasoned that it would be
illogical
to continue to apply the per se presumption in antitrust
8
21

law.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1352.
Id. at 1353-54.
Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45.
See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1284.
Id.
Id. at 1293.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1284.
Id. at 1290-91.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
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In attempting to trace the origins of the unsubstantiated assumption
in International Salt Co. v. United States219 that patent ties tend to
accomplish monopolies, the Court looked to the Government's brief in
International Salt.22' The brief, taking its reasoning from the Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co. 221 patent misuse decision, stated that
even though the Court in Morton Salt made its decision on patent
grounds and not on antitrust grounds, the rationale behind the Morton
Salt decision was identical to the rationale of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 222 Therefore, the Court concluded that it was compelled to reach
the same result in InternationalSalt as it reached in Morton Salt.22 s
Furthermore, the Court adopted the Government's interpretation "'that
this type of restraint is unlawful on its face under the Sherman Act,'"
and held that the tying arrangement was a per se violation of antitrust
22 4
laws.

The Court also justified its holding by harmonizing patent and
antitrust law and noted that the per se presumption in antitrust law for
patent tying arrangements created dramatically different consequences
for the patentee under patent and antitrust law. 2 25 The Reform Act
imposed a higher burden of proof for the patent misuse defense in the
context of civil liability.226 In contrast, antitrust law required a much
lower burden of proof because of the per se presumption, but a finding
of guilt subjects the patentee to a criminal sentence of up to ten years
in prison.2 2' This inconsistency of having a lower burden of proof for
criminal liability while requiring a much higher burden of proof for civil
liability provides additional support for the decision to abandon the per
2 s
se rule for patent tying arrangements in antitrust law.
Finally, the Court recognized that its "strong disapproval of tying
arrangements has substantially diminished" and that the Court has
recently begun to require a showing of market power in the tying
product. 2 ' As a result, a patent tying arrangement violates antitrust
law only when the plaintiff affirmatively proves that the patentee has
market power in the patented product market.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1289.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1289.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
Id. at 1286.
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V. RULE OF REASON APPROACH RESONATES FAR BEYOND PATENT
TYING ARRANGEMENTS

A.

Why the Rule of Reason is the Right Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision to adopt a rule of reason approach for
patent tying arrangements is supported by legal and economic principles.
Prior to the Supreme Court's reversal of the per se rule in Illinois Tool
Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,20 lower courts had recognized that
the rule was too harsh on businesses."' As a result, those courts
developed various mechanisms to circumvent the rule, such as allowing
the defendant businesses to show business justifications or to demonstrate the absence of market power in the tying market. 23 2 A rule of
reason analysis requires the plaintiff to affirmatively prove the
patentee's market power in the tying product market, rather than
shifting the burden to the patentee to show the absence of such market
power in the case of a rebuttable per se presumption.
One justification for the lower courts' approach is that tying arrangements are not categorically harmful to competition and that business
justifications may compel the use of such arrangements. While the
lower courts embraced some of the economic analysis relevant to
determining the effects of the patent tying arrangement, a full balancing
of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects had not been adopted.
Economists, who recognized the potential efficiency of certain tying
arrangements, have long urged the courts to abandon the per se
approach and adopt a full rule of reason analysis."a These economists
believe that the per se approach should be reserved for conduct that has
no possible legal or economic justification, such as division of market
territories among competitors.2' However, some questions remain as
to whether tying arrangements generate efficiencies whose benefits
exceed the potential harm to competition. Under a rule of reason
approach, judges will be given an opportunity to ascertain the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of tying arrangements on a case-bycase basis, which will increase the courts' competence in analyzing tying
arrangements. The rule of reason approach broadly examines all of the

230. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
231. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163-64 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing numerous district court and circuit court opinions for the proposition that market
power is not presumed in patent tying arrangements).
232. Id.
233. See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1293.
234. See Contl T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 44 (1977).
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business and market factors that bear upon whether a particular
practice is "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."" 5
B.

Immediate Implicationsfor Patent 7ing Arrangements

Illinois Tool Works made it clear that a plaintiff challenging a tying
arrangement under the Sherman Act has the burden of proof to properly
define the market in which a tie must be analyzed and to prove, without
the benefit of any presumptions, that the patentee has market power in
the tying market."' As a result, the Court's holding further limits the
type of conduct that is deemed per se illegal under antitrust law.
While tying arrangements can still be per se illegal under current
antitrust precedent if a party with market power enters into such an
arrangement, the Court's opinion raises the burden for plaintiffs seeking
to establish liability by requiring actual proof of the defendant's market
power. Courts cannot presume this power from the existence of the
patent or from the mere fact that the tying arrangement provides a
means to price-discriminate among different purchasers." 7 Proof of
the defendant's market power will probably require economic evidence
analogous to the evidence required to prove market power in rule of
reason cases under the Sherman Act, which normally requires proof that
the defendant has a share of at least thirty percent in the tying market
or some other proof of market power.23 '
Further, while the decision explicitly refers to patent tying arrangements, the holding should easily extend by analogy to apply equally to
copyrights. As a result, businesses that rely heavily on patents and
copyrights will still need to identify the efficiencies that are created by
a patent tying arrangement. However, those businesses will benefit
from this ruling, which provides some protection to sellers who tend to
bundle unprotected products with the sale of patented or copyrighted
items.
C.

HarmonizationBetween Antitrust and Patent Law

Illinois Tool Works contributes to further harmonization at the
intersection of antitrust and patent law. A certain tension has always
existed between these two bodies of law. Patent law does sometimes
enable a patent owner to exercise market power when no good substi-

235. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
236. Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1293.
237. Id. at 1292.
238. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984) (observing
that thirty percent market share was insufficient for market power in a tying case).
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tutes exist for a patented product. On some occasions, patent statutes
appear to grant a degree of immunity from antitrust liability. The
Patent Act, for example, explicitly permits a patent owner to license its
patent using territorial restraints that might otherwise be illegal under
antitrust law.2"' In contrast, an overly aggressive antitrust policy may
undermine the incentive structure behind the patent laws by reducing
the expected payoff from the creation of innovative new products.
Furthermore, patent law, through the patent misuse doctrine, appears
to take the position that the potential long-run gains from patent
protection are outweighed by other potential short- or long-run costs,
such as costs resulting from an excessive reduction in competition.
This decision brings antitrust principles of patent tying arrangements
in line with the stated views of the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies and most economists. The Supreme Court noted that Congress
no longer intended mere ownership of a patent to provide its owner with
market power.240
Reflecting that penalties were more severe for
violations of antitrust laws than patent laws, the Court concluded that
it would "be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that
the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not
constitute 'misuse."'24 1 The Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission's Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property already state that the enforcement agencies "will not
presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers
market power upon its owner."242
D. Broader Implications for After-Market Industry and Consumers
Furthermore, the decision is an almost certain death knell to the aftermarket product industry. For example, printer manufacturers will now
be able to condition the sale of their printers on agreements by
purchasers to buy branded inks. This would virtually eliminate the
market for recycling, recharging, and remanufacturing inkjet cartridges.
Exclusion of cost-reducing competition in the after-market industry will
allow brand manufacturers to raise prices. Ultimately, consumers will
pay the price for the elimination of after-market competition.

239. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
240. Ill.
Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1290.
241. Id. at 1291.
242. IP Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.2.
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E. Small Businesses Will Lose a Powerful Weapon Against Big
Corporations
Smaller companies that are bringing claims against larger companies
who tie patented and unpatented products now have a more difficult
burden at trial and will lose the leverage they held to push for out-ofcourt settlements. This decision further cements the antitrust policy
that has created a systemic bias against small business. This bias is
created by the presence of large companies, the imbalance of power in
transactions between large companies and small businesses, and large
companies' strategic use of power against small businesses in the form
of increased costs or forcing the acceptance of unfavorable terms.
Due to the presence of antitrust laws, large companies today lack pure
monopoly power that existed at the time the Sherman Act was passed.
Typically, these companies are in markets that are dominated by at least
two of these giant organizations. In addition to large size, these
companies typically possess significant market power.
In many
situations, these companies will use their power against small businesses that lack significant market power. As a result, small businesses are
the targets of antitrust abuse when they act as purchasers, sellers, or
competitors to large companies. These small companies are disadvantaged because they lack the leverage to check the market power of the
large companies.
One type of bias against small businesses is that the small business
seller may not be able to sell at the same prices as larger organizations.
This practice is commonly known as price discrimination. For example,
consider a small potato chip distributor that markets its chips in direct
competition with Frito Lay or Tostito's. Because of their strong brand
image and market power, the large companies can demand a higher
price from buyers. In contrast, the local chip manufacturer does not
possess enough market power to demand similar pricing as the major
chip manufacturers.
Companies with significant market power can only be checked if small
businesses are able to compete in the market and provide direct
competition that will incorporate new ideas and energy. Furthermore,
these small businesses function as a natural class of antitrust enforcers.
As frequent victims of antitrust abuse, these small companies have the
incentive and information to bring successful antitrust challenges in
court. While it is important to provide threshold barriers to opportunistic suits, the screening rules must not bar meritorious claims. If the
threshold is too high, the small companies lose their competitive
advantage, and antitrust competition goals suffer as a result.
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Bias Against Small Business is a Boon for Competition

While large organizations are the primary beneficiaries of market
power, antitrust policy should not be entirely against large companies.
Large companies reach their size because it is part of the natural,
competitive economy and is a necessary evolution to survive in a global
market. As such, an antitrust policy that strictly favors small businesses would not contribute to the long-term health of our economy. Rather,
the goal of competition policy should be to promote and preserve
competition on its merits while maintaining a neutral attitude toward
the size of the company. While larger size can lead to market power
that is exercised at the expense of small businesses, larger corporations
also possess the ability to produce items at a more efficient cost. To
justify allowing large companies to maintain some level of market power,
there must be some basis to show that the procompetitive result cannot
be obtained by a less anticompetitive method. Otherwise, the anticompetitive conduct, which may involve monopolization or tying arrangements, should be prohibited by antitrust law.
The strongest area to justify the toleration of large businesses'
anticompetitive tactics may be found in price discrimination. All sellers
desire to find a means to charge higher prices to buyers that can afford
it, while charging lower prices to buyers who cannot afford premium
prices. One argument against policing price discrimination is that it
may remove one of the natural factors that enable buyers to force lower
prices. If the large sellers knew that they could not charge higher prices
to those who lack market power, then those same sellers will resist
lowering prices to those who have market power. , Such a policy may
force sellers to band together and fix prices in a particular market where
those higher prices would be passed on to the consumers and would
ultimately undermine the goal of encouraging competition. However,
cost savings produced from bulk purchasing that are passed along to the
buyer in the form of reduced pricing is not considered price discrimination and would be unaffected by any price discrimination regulation.
Furthermore, even true price discrimination may be tolerated if the
method is unlikely to result in anticompetitive effects. In essence, large
companies must be allowed to exert some of their market power against
small businesses to ultimately provide society with the benefit of such
competition. But, the paradox of this logic is that allowing such exertion
makes it more difficult for the small business to survive.
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G. Balancing the Harm to Small Business with the Benefit to
Competition
To ensure their survival, small businesses have some options to
readjust the balance of market power: (1) consolidate and become one
of the giants; (2) form collective buying or selling associations; or (3)
resort to antitrust remedies against the large companies. While small
businesses have some latitude to merge with one another under current
antitrust law, many companies prefer to remain independent and
consider the second and third options to be more attractive and realistic.
As to the option of forming cooperative agreements, antitrust law is
not particularly tolerant of sellers' agreements under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. In numerous instances, the Supreme Court has invalidated sellers'
agreements by stating that these agreements violate a per se rule under
§ 1.243 However, the Court may be more accepting of buyers' agreements. 24 This hostile attitude toward these agreements among small
businesses places these companies at a competitive disadvantage.
Consequently, antitrust law should allow small businesses to engage in
collective bargaining agreements so long as the market share does not
exceed the limits of the current merger enforcement policy.
As to the option of bringing antitrust claims, the current trend in
antitrust law has been to increase the difficulty of bringing claims by
small businesses. The trend began in the 1970's when economists began
to believe that the overreaching antitrust protection was undermining
the goals of competition.245 As a result, courts have created rules that
have limited access to the courts and have made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove an antitrust violation. The most recent decision by
the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works is another brick in the wall
that serves as a hurdle to prevent small businesses from bringing
antitrust claims against large companies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is an inherent tension between the disciplines of antitrust and
patent law. The use of a presumption of market power based on the
ownership of a patent in the antitrust analysis shifted the balance too

243. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
244. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
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far in favor of antitrust law. The per se rule was based on a misconception of the effects of the legal exclusionary rights conferred to patentees.
In light of the present flaws and the eradication of the legal precedent
supporting the presumption, the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois
Tool Works to eliminate the per se rule and adopt a rule of reason
approach for patent tying arrangements was a step in the right direction
to harmonize these two doctrines. By reversing the per se presumption,
the Court brought the jurisprudence of patent tying arrangements into
alignment with the rest of modem antitrust and economic views. The
rule of reason approach allows courts to look at the actual effects of the
patent tying arrangements on the economy, consumers, and the owners
of such property. Consideration of actual market conditions prior to
condemnation of a tying arrangement preserves the rights of patent
owners, except in situations that truly warrant invalidation of the
arrangements.
TIFFANY L. WILLIAMS

